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CULTURAL PRIORITIES REVEALED:
THE DEVELOPMENT AND
REGULATION OF ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND ISRAEL
Ellen Waldman
INTRODUCTION
Although the birth of Louise Brown, the world's first test-tube
baby, I was England's singular achievement, Assisted Reproductive
Technology (ART) is now a global industry. Advances in the scien-
tific facilitation of conception offer individuals and infertile couples2 a
cornucopia of options, ranging from the relatively low-tech process of
artificial insemination (Al) to the more complex mixing and matching
involved in in vitro fertilization (IVF) and surrogacy. 3 The growing
1 Louise Brown was born in 1978 in Oldham, England. Her in vitro birth
resulted from collaboration of Oldham gynecologist, Patrick Steptoe, and two Cam-
bridge physicians, Robert Edwards and Barry Bavister. Ms. Brown's own views
regarding her provenance capture modem ambivalence over our new-found control
over the procreative process. When interviewed in her twenties about the forward
march of the new ART frontiers, Ms. Brown stated that if she proved to be infertile,
she would not avail herself of the new technologies. See BabyCenter, Babies of the
Century, Science Makes Miracle Babies, Louise Brown, http://www.babycenter.com/
general/981 l.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
2 Infertility is traditionally defined as the inability to get pregnant after one
year of unprotected sex. MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE,
NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH 927 (Marie T. O'Toole ed., Elsevier Science 7th ed.
2003). Although "infertility" refers to heterosexual couples being unable to conceive
for physiological reasons, ART techniques are also used by single women seeking to
mother, but not mate, as well as, lesbians and gay men who wish to become parents.
3 Artificial insemination is a non-surgical procedure whereby sperm from
someone other than the woman's husband is placed in her cervix or uterus. See
Mathew Tomlinson & Chris Barratt, Donor Insemination, in GOOD CLINICAL
PRACTICE IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 86, 86-96 (Paul Serhal & Caroline Overton
eds., 2004). In vitro fertilization involves retrieving a woman's eggs, fertilizing them
in a culture dish, and transferring the fertilized eggs back into the woman's uterus.
See Tim J. Child et al., Techniques for IVF, in GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE IN ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION 129, 129-42 (Paul Serhal & Caroline Overton eds., 2004). Last, sur-
rogacy involves having a woman, other than an intended mother, gestate and deliver
HEALTH MATRIX
ingenuity and efficacy of fertility-enhancing therapeutics has spurred
the development of markets in gametes,4 surrogates, 5 and advanced
clinical techniques. 6 At the same time, it has challenged each nation to
answer the puzzling question: what stance should we take toward
these developing markets? Do we celebrate our growing power over
the "natural" processes of reproduction, or fear its hubris? Do we seek
to expand every individual's capacity to achieve biological parent-
hood, or view reproductive potential as appropriately bounded?
the baby. In this situation, the egg can be harvested from the intended mother, the
surrogate, or another woman; and the sperm can likewise be from any source. See
Peter R. Brinsden, Surrogacy, in GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE IN ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION 199, 199-207 (Paul Serhal & Caroline Overton eds., 2004). See also
AM. SOC'Y FOR REPROD. MED., THIRD PARTY REPRODUCTION (DONOR EGGS, DONOR
SPERM, DONOR EMBRYOS, & SURROGACY): A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS 4, 13 (1996),
available at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/thirdparty.pdf.
4 There are 428 fertility clinics in the U.S., reporting over 115,000 cycles
performed annually. Ninety-nine percent of these clinics offer 1VF treatment; 90
percent offer egg donation and implantation; and 60 percent provide embryo transfer
treatments. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., 2002 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES:
NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 13, 71 (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART02/PDF/ART2002.pdf.
5 A brief jaunt down the information super-highway reveals numerous
matchmaking sites for surrogates and intended parents. Surrogates interested in plying
their services may either post ads on the internet or visit an attorney or broker who
will assist in pairing them with an interested couple. See Law Offices of Theresa M.
Erickson, http://www.surrogacylawyer.net/surogate.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006)
and The American Surrogacy Center, http://www.surrogacy.com (last visited Jan. 12,
2006).
6 The ability to manipulate gametes has spawned a full menu of clinical
procedures available to individuals and couples suffering biological impediments to
conception. Gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) is similar to IVF, but the combined
egg and sperm are placed in the fallopian tubes prior to fertilization. Combining char-
acteristics of IVF and GIFT, in zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT) fertilization
occurs in the culture dish, but the zygote is placed in the fallopian tubes, rather than in
the uterus. See Ehab Kelada & Ian Craft, Alternatives to In Vitro Fertilization: Gam-
ete Intrafallopian Transfer and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer, in GOOD CLINICAL
PRACTICE IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 256, 256-63 (Paul Serhal & Caroline Overton
eds., 2004). In intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), a single sperm is injected
directly into the cytoplasm of a mature egg. Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART
(Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law Protect Them From Harm?
2004 UTAH L. REV. 57, 58 n.4 (2004). The newest innovation in fertility therapies is
egg freezing, which allows women to delay child-bearing choices, avoid entangle-
ments with sperm donors, and ensure the availability of high quality eggs. The freez-
ing and thawing process is still a work in progress, but some clinics have reported an
80 percent success rate in thawing viable eggs. See Claudia Kalb, Fertility and the
Freezer, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 2004, at 52, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
5505094/site/newsweek.
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A nation's approach to the burgeoning ART industry reflects
deep-rooted cultural imperatives.7 Choices regarding how ART should
be regulated and funded, as well as how ART-related disputes should
be mediated, reflect both specific attitudes toward family and parent-
hood, as well as broader notions about the role of the state in encour-
aging or impeding novel family forms. A nation's religious character,
history, and culturally idiosyncratic response to world events all play
a role. A brief survey of countries wealthy enough to nurture a tech-
nology-intensive fertility industry reveals a wide variety of practices.
Countries with strong ties to the Catholic Church generally adopt re-
strictive policies, in deference to the faith-based notion that creating
life falls within God's exclusive jurisdiction.8 More secular nations
7 The term "culture" has many definitions. Traditionally, it is thought to
embody the shared perceptions of a given people. A slightly more precise label, of-
fered by anthropologists Spradley and McCurdy, maintains that culture contains the
"categories, plans and rules people employ to interpret their world and act purpose-
fully in it." CONFORMITY AND CONFLICT: READINGS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 2-3
(James Spradley & David W. McCurdy eds., Allyn & Bacon 2005) (1974). Addition-
ally, anthropologist John Bodley has argued that all culture includes the following
properties: it is shared, learned, symbolic, transmitted cross-generationally, adaptive,
and integrated. JOHN H. BODLEY, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY: TRIBES, STATES, AND
THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 9-10 (3rd ed. 2000).
8 Thus, Italy and Austria have adopted stringent controls on ART use while
a recently empanelled commission in Ireland has called for regulation of that coun-
try's nascent ART industry. In Italy, for instance, government funded clinics may
only perform fertility procedures that utilize the sperm and egg of a married couple,
and doctors are forbidden from artificially fertilizing single or widowed women and
lesbians. Mary E. Canoles, Comment, Italy's Family Values: Embracing the Evolu-
tion of Family to Save the Population, 21 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 183,194 (2002); See
also Clara Park, Italy Holds Referendums on Assisted Reproduction, WOMEN'S
ENEWS, Apr. 18, 2005, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfn/dyn/aid/2261/
context/archive (last visited Jan. 13, 2006) (discussing Italy's Law 40 that "estab-
lishes the legal rights of an embryo," limits physicians to implanting a maximum of
three fertilized embryos at one time, and "restricts artificial insemination to 'stable'
heterosexual couples"). In Austria, IVF may not use sperm from a third party donor.
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Process of Regulating Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nologies: What We Can Learn From Our Neighbors-What Translates and What
Does Not, 45 Loy. L. REV. 247, 263 (1999). Ireland is currently host to fewer than ten
ART clinics. Services provided must be privately funded, and many providers are
uncomfortable offering ART treatments to lesbians and single women. See COMM'N
ON ASSISTED HUMAN REPROD., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION XI, 21 (2005). Article 40 of the Irish Constitution protects the "un-
born" and it remains unclear how that provision will affect the production, storage
and ultimate disposition of surplus embryos created during IVF or other procedures.
Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/
publications/297.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). The Commission recommends that
"[a]ppropriate guidelines should be put in place by the regulatory body to govern the
options available for excess frozen embryos. These would include voluntary donation
20061
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whose highest cultural priority is to protect individual dignity and
personhood look askance at ART techniques they believe accord too
little respect to early life forms. 9 And, countries with more communi-
tarian, socialist traditions settle for a regime in which ART techniques
are permitted, but heavily regulated and supervised by government
agencies.'l
The United States and Israel are widely regarded as possessing
two of the most ART-friendly environments in the world. Both coun-
tries stand at the epicenter of fertility-related research and practice and
support the supply and demand sides of the ART market with avid-
ity.1' Yet, the flourishing of ART in each country takes a different
form, shaped by divergent legal and financial policies reflecting
deeper cultural values.12
Israeli ART policies are unapologetically pronatalist. Baby-
making in Israel is perceived as a positive good, and both religious
and secular authorities are surprisingly supportive of medical technol-
of excess healthy embryos to other recipients, voluntary donation for research or
allowing them to perish." COMM'N ON AssISTED HUMAN REPROD., supra, at XV. It
should be noted that adoption of this provision was not unanimous. Id.
9 John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology in Germany and the United
States: An Essay in Comparative Law and Bioethics, 43 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L.
189, 194-95 (2004) (noting that both World War II and "the searing experience of the
Holocaust" have led Germany and other European nations to privilege the honor and
dignity of all persons above the primacy of individual autonomy).
10 See generally Loane Skene, An Overview of Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology Regulation in Australia andNew Zealand, 35 TEX. INT'L L. J. 31 (2000).
11 A survey of the geographical distribution of publications in two leading
journals in the infertility field, Fertility and Sterility and Human Reproduction, re-
veals that both the United States and Israel are highly prolific contributors. The
United States produced the most publications in absolute numbers, accounting for 28
percent of all publications in both journals combined. Taking country size and wealth
into account, however, Israel was most impressive, generating the greatest number of
publications relative to its population and gross domestic product. See Jan A. M.
Kremer et al., Geographical Distribution of Publications in Human Reproduction and
Fertility and Sterility in the 1990s, 15 HuM. REPROD. 1653, 1655 (2000).
12 John Robertson makes this point eloquently in his comparative work on
American and German approaches to ART, embryonic stem cell research, cloning and
preimplantation genetic diagnosis. Robertson notes that German law, congruent with
European law, generally, is shaped by that region's transition from a feudal hierarchy
with sharp status differentiations to a more democratic conception of individual
worth. Consequently, honoring each individual's dignitary interests remains of para-
mount concern. In America, by contrast, the preservation of individual liberty and
autonomy drives legal and political decision-making. As Robertson notes, "The re-
ception of ARTs in the United States cannot be adequately understood without an
appreciation of the country's long tradition of individual liberty, free market and free
enterprise orientation, and grants of wide autonomy to physicians and other profes-
sionals." Robertson, supra note 9, at 192.
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ogy capable of lending infertile women a procreative assist. Despite
the conservative pull Jewish scripture exerts over Israeli law, the fer-
tility industry in Israel services married couples, lesbians, and single
women alike, and religious authorities appear complicit with provid-
ers in a "don't ask-don't tell" partnership of mutual avoidance. Fertil-
ity clinics do not keep statistics on the numbers of non-traditional
families they help create and religious authorities have chosen not to
agitate against the possible Halachic'3 violations implicit in ART ac-
tivities. Beginning with the premise that government owes each citi-
zen access to a minimum standard of healthcare, Israel defines ART
as part of that basic package. To that end, Israel adopts ART-friendly
legal and financial policies, while exacting a price from aspiring par-
ents in terms of privacy and control.
In the United States, where government-sponsored healthcare is
the exception, not the rule, free-market preferences combined with
ambivalence about ART's "brave new world" capacities yield an un-
ruly, unregulated patchwork environment. This regulatory vacuum has
allowed ART suppliers to offer their wares with little interference
from either federal or state governments. ART consumers enjoy con-
siderable choice and autonomy in deciding how to pursue parenthood,
but they proceed in a caveat emptor environment with little financial
assistance and scant legal protection. As in most arenas of American
bioethics, concern for individual autonomy appears the predominant
value. 14 Yet, in the unique area of assisted reproduction, the impulse
to further procreative choice chafes against an ingrained suspicion of
novel family forms.
This article takes a comparative approach to assisted reproduction
practices and regulation in Israel and the United States, focusing on
the imprint of cultural priorities on each nation's legal framework and
financial policies. Part I examines Israeli and American cultural
features that influence emerging ART practices. Part II reviews the
use and financing of artificial insemination and IVF in Israel and the
United States, including the state's role in the delivery of these
services. Part III turns to ART's aftermath-examining how disputes
regarding the disposition of frozen embryos are handled in each
country.
13 The Halacha, or religious laws of the Jewish people, consist of the Torah,
the five books of Moses and two additional texts of Talmud, the Mishnah and the
Gemarah. The latter two texts, dating from 100 B.C contain interpretations and com-
mentary on the Torah. See JACQUELINE PORTUGUESE, FERTILITY POLICY IN ISRAEL:
THE POLITICS OF RELIGION, GENDER, AND NATION 45 (1998).
14 See CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS,
DOCTORS AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998).
2006]
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The swift pace of innovation in the fertility industry will force
each nation to confront the disparate visions that ignite legal and ethi-
cal debate about ART. The future of ART will be shaped by how the
culture wars in each country are fought and won. And, while it seems
clear that culture will powerfully mark the development of ART, it
remains unclear whether the relationship between national values and
ART might someday become more mutually transforming. If today
ART serves primarily as a map on which we can read a nation's cul-
tural geography, perhaps in the future a nation's experience with ART
will inspire change in traditional understandings of kinship, parent-
hood, and the state's role in facilitating family.
I. CULTURAL CONTEXT
A. Israel
Israeli culture sanctifies child-bearing as a crucial life task. As the
head of Israel's largest IVF clinic commented, "In Israel, a family
without children is nothing .... Couples who do not have children
soon find themselves outsiders. They feel they have no place in soci-
ety.... . The cultural bias that defines life with children as meaning-
ful and life without them as fundamentally lacking has religious, his-
torical, psychological and political roots.
Religious mandates to "be fruitful and multiply" 16 echo through-
out a number of authoritative Jewish texts. The curse of the barren
woman unites several of the biblical matriarchs' narratives, reminding
the reader that the quest for children reaches back to time immemo-
rial. Sara, Rachael, Rebekah, and Hannah were all infertile, and their
desperate desire for children guided their every action. Rebekah's
misery prompted her husband, Isaac, to plead with God for a child, 7
while Rachel, overcome with disappointment over her childlessness,
begged her husband "Give me children, or else I [will] die."'18 Sara
and Rachel both gave their husbands to handmaidens to bring children
into their household,' 9 while Hannah importuned God herself, promis-
ing that if He gave her a son, she would give him back to do the
15 Nicky Blackburn, I Will Become a Mother at Any Cost, TiMES ONLINE,
July 19, 2004, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7-1181778,00.html (last visited
Jan. 13, 2006) (quoting Professor Shlomo Mashiach).
16 Genesis 1:28 (King James).
17 Genesis 25:21 (King James).
18 Genesis 30:1 (King James).
19 Genesis 16:2 (King James) (Sara); Genesis 30:3 (King James) (Rachel).
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Lord's work.2° In each case, God performs a miracle, taking pity on
the childless woman, "remembering her,",21 and opening her "closed
womb" 22 so that she can conceive a child.
Reproduction as a means by which a tribe gains and consolidates
power is also a powerful theme in the Torah. God's pact with the peo-
ple of Israel is portrayed as a covenant of fertility, awarded in return
for the Israelites' monotheism. God promises Abraham that fidelity,
as marked by the practice of circumcision, will be rewarded with fe-
cundity. "This is my covenant with you. You shall be the father of a
multitude of nations. I will make you exceedingly fertile. 23 Later,
Moses tells the wayward Israelites,
[I]f you do obey these rules... the Lord your God will main-
tain faithfully for you the covenant that He made on oath with
your fathers.... He will favor you and bless you and multiply
you .... You shall be blessed above all other peoples: there
shall be no sterile male or female among you or among your
livestock.24
Because biblical narratives such as these permeate Israeli culture,
even most secular Israelis accept them as part of a foundational liter-
ary, cultural, and historic text. Those Israelis who may not accept or
agree with every aspect of Jewish law are still subjected to a powerful
current of pro-childbirth messages from childhood forward.
Israel's pro-creation perspective is further linked to the tragic
history of the Jews in the last century. The Holocaust, which claimed
the lives of six million Jews and wiped out nearly two-thirds of
European Jewry, 25 catalyzed Israel's existence and looms large in the
20 1 Samuel 1:11 (King James).
21 When Hannah finally became pregnant, it was because "the Lord remem-
bered her." 1 Samuel 1:19 (King James).
22 See Genesis 29:31 (King James) (Leah) and Genesis 30:32 (King James)
(Rachel).
23 Genesis 17:4, 6 (King James). After telling Abraham "I will multiply you
exceedingly," God demands, "on your part, you and your descendants after you must
keep my covenant throughout the ages ... every male among you shall be circum-
cised ... and that shall be the mark of the covenant between you and me." Genesis
17: 10-11 (King James).
24 Deuteronomy 7:12-14 (King James). Because a large family will consoli-
date status and wealth of the family line, a blessed man's wife "shall be a fruitful
vine; and children like olive plants around the table." Psalms 128:3 (King James).
25 Over three million Jews were killed in gas chambers in extermination
camps; others faced death by shooting, random acts of terror, and starvation. Nancy S.
Williams, Comment, Political Question or Judicial Query: An Examination of the
Modern Doctrine and Its Inapplicability to Human Rights Mass Tort Litigation, 28
2006]
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nation's collective consciousness. Enormous pressure exists to
"replace" that lost population, creating new family trees in recognition
of the many families whose genealogies came to a crushing end in the
Nazi death-factories.
26
Concerns that intermarriage and assimilation are diluting Jewish
identity also figure into supportive attitudes toward Jewish
reproduction. A 1990 survey sponsored by the United Jewish
Communities and the Jewish Federation system reported that over
half of all "born Jews" were married to non-Jews. This statistic
prompted vocal handwringing and campaigns to reverse
assimilationist trends seen as "destr[oying] the Jewish people in a
microcosmic way. ,27 Despite official condemnation by religious 28 and
PEPP. L. REv. 849, 850 n.5 (2001) (citing United States Holocaust Memorial Museum,
http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/fsol.htm (last visited July 10, 2005)). See also
DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS
AND THE HOLOCAUST 4 (1996). Nearly five thousand communities were destroyed and
cities that had for centuries prospered as centers of Jewish learning and culture were
razed flat. For instance, Jews had been in Lithuania since 997. Starting in 1941, a
genocidal extermination effort spanning three years, wiped out 96 percent of the
Jewish population. Samoilas Kacas & Mausa Bairakas, The Kaunas Jewish Religious
Community Report (2004), http://www.wcjcs.org/materials/311004/Jews in Lithua
nia.doc. Likewise, prior to WWII, Warsaw had been home to the largest number of
Jews in any city in Europe. In a single day, over fifty-six thousand Jews in Warsaw
were killed and their homes destroyed, along with the Great Synagogue. As the
German General Stroop succinctly stated in his telegraph back to Berlin, "[t]he
former Jewish quarter of Warsaw has ceased to exist." Peter K. Gessner, For Over
Two Months. .. , available at http://info-poland.buffalo.edulclassroom/uprising.html
(last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
26 SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT OF
ASSISTED CONCEPTION IN ISRAEL 4 (2000).
27 RHODA ANN KANAANEH, BIRTHING THE NATION: STRATEGIES OF
PALESTINIAN WOMEN IN ISRAEL 45 (2002) (citing Craig Horowitz, Are American Jews
Disappearing?, N. Y. TIMES MAG., July 17, 1997, at 108).
28 Jewish law, considered binding by Orthodox and Conservative Jewry,
forbids intermarriage and Orthodox leaders are prohibited from officiating at inter-
faith weddings. See JUDY PETSONIK & JIM REMSEN, THE INTERMARRIAGE HANDBOOK:
A GUIDE FOR JEWS AND CHRISTIANS 64-65 (1988). See also Shelley Leveson & Cecily
Ruttenberg, Marrying Outside the Tribe-A Growing Trend, JEWISH COMMUNITY
NEWS, June 2004, available at http://www.jewishsiliconvalley.org/jcn/06_2004/
intermarriage.html. While Reform rabbis are authorized to preside over marriages
between Jews and non-Jews, an estimated half of them choose not to. Julie Wiener,
Survey: Intermarriage Acceptance Growing, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, Oct. 31,
2000, at 1. Textual support for this prohibition comes from the writings of Ezra, who
counseled Israeli men to divorce their non-Jewish wives. When Ezra returned to
rebuild the commonwealth he admonished, "So now, do not give your daughters to
their sons, and do not wed their daughters to your sons .... Ezra 9:12 (King James).
"[S]eparate yourselves from the people of the land, and from the strange wives." Ezra
10:11 (King James).
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political leaders, 29 the intermarriage rate among American Jews-a
significant portion of world Jewry30-appears to have stabilized at
around 52 percent,3' causing concern that absent a rise in Jewish-
baby-making, Jewish traditions, identity, 32 life-styles, and cohesion
will ultimately become extinct.33
Politically, Israel's unique status as a democratic Jewish state with
a burgeoning minority population of Israeli Arabs also pushes toward
a pronatalist stance. Anxiety over Israel's "demographic time-bomb"
29 See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, Backing Into A Jewish Majority in Israel,
http://www.jcpa.org/dje/articles2/majority.htm ("It is one of the saddest ironies of our
times that... the Jewish people are in the midst of a demographic self-destruction of
major proportions"). See also WHEN VIcTIMS RULE: A CRITIQUE OF JEWISH PRE-
EMINENCE IN AMERICA ch. 15, http://holywar.org/jewishtr/1Sassim.htm (last visited
Jan. 14, 2006) ("'Any rabbi who officiates [at an intermarriage] is approving it. It will
destroy the character, the uniqueness of the Jewish people, which we are obligated to
perpetuate'.... 'No Judaism, halikhic or otherwise sanctions marriage between Jews
and non Jews without threatening Jewish continuity at its foundations.") (citations
omitted).
30 There are 5.2 million Jews in the United States and 5.5 million in Israel.
These are the two largest centers of Jewry in the world. After 1,000 Years, Israel is
Largest Jewish Center, ISR. NAT'L NEWS, May 1, 2005, available at http://www.
arutzsheva.com/news.php3?id=81071.
31 See United Jewish Cmtys: The Fed'ns of N. Am., NJPS: Differences with
the 1990 NJPS Highlights Report, http://www.ujc.org/content display.html?
ArticleID=83912 (last visited Jan. 14, 2006) (explaining that close examination of the
2000-2001 research data reveals a 52 percent intermarriage rate, which is the same as
the data gathered in 1990, despite the fact the 2000-2001 report initially reported a 43
percent intermarriage rate; the discrepancy is attributable to a narrower definition of
"born Jews" employed in the latter study).
32 Concerns that intermarriage results in children with weaker religious
and/or cultural identity appear valid. For example, in an extensive survey of college
freshman, conducted in 2001 and sponsored by the Hillel Foundation for Jewish
Campus life, researcher Linda J. Sax found that over 92 percent of subjects with two
Jewish parents self-identified as being Jewish, whereas subjects with only one Jewish
parent did so at a much lower rate. Thirty-seven percent with only a Jewish mother
self-identified as Jewish, while only 15 percent with only a Jewish father did so.
LINDA J. SAX, AMERICA'S JEWISH FRESHMEN: CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS AND
RECENT TRENDS AMONG STUDENTS ENTERING COLLEGE 54 (2002), available at
http://www.hillel.org/Hillel/NewHille.nsf/fcb8259ca861ae57852567d30043ba26/
Oefla4133951 fba85256bdcOO4ca4b/$FLE/AJF-web.pdf.
33 To combat this trend toward intermarriage and assimilation, the Israeli
government, in conjunction with funding from various Jewish organizations in Amer-
ica, initiated a two hundred million dollar program, called "Birthright Israel," to give
young American Jews round-trip airfare to Israel to strengthen their bond with Israel
and Judaism. See generally the funding description at Taglit-birthright Israel,
http://www.birthrightisrael.com (follow "About Us" hyperlink). Another program,
called "Newlywed Israel Incentive" provides Jews who marry with $2,000 to take
their honeymoon in Israel. Ron Hayes, Israel Honeymoon Stipends Help Teach Faith,
PALM BEACH POST (FL.), July 24, 2000, at lB.
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dates back almost to Israel's birth, when Jews constituted roughly 86
percent of Israel's population.34 In 1949, the state sought to raise the
Jewish birth rate by establishing an award for "heroic mothers" who
bore at least ten children. 35 Interest in incentivizing childbirth contin-
ued throughout Ben Gurion's nearly fifteen-year reign as prime minis-
ter,36 leading, in 1968, to the establishment of a demographic center
witfiin the prime minister's office devoted to the goal of increasing
Jewish reproduction.
37
If anything, the consistent gulf between Jewish and Arab birth-
rates has heightened Israel's "demographic obsession., 38 Average
Jewish birth rates have declined from a rate of 3.9 births per woman in
the early 1950s to a consistent flat-line of 2.8. 39 Births to Arab Mus-
lim women peaked at 9.3 in the mid-1960s but fell dramatically to
reach a rate of 4.6 twenty years later, where it remains to the present
day.40 Even with the decline in Arab fertility rates, Israeli demogra-
phers estimate that without dramatic changes in the configuration of
state borders, Jews will comprise only 42 percent of Israel's popula-
tion by the year 2020.41
34 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 55, at
5, available at http://www.israelipalestinianprocon.org/populationpalestine.html (last
visited Dec. 30, 2005).
35 NuR MASALHA, A LAND WITHOUT A PEOPLE: ISRAEL, TRANSFER AND THE
PALESTINIANS 1949-96 144 (1997). The award was discontinued when it became
evident that Arab women were the consistent recipients. Id.
36 Dov FRIEDLANDER & CALVIN GOLDSCHEIDER, THE POPULATION OF ISRAEL
120-22, 130-38 (1979).
37 NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, ISRAELI WOMEN AND MEN: DIVISIONS BEHIND THE
UNIrY 61 (1982). See also FRIEDLANDER & GOLDSCHEIDER, supra note 36, at 138.
38 Will Youmans, Understanding the Existential Threat: Israel's Demo-
graphic Obsession, COUNTERPUNCH, Dec. 7, 2002, http://www.counterpunch.org/
youmans1207.html; Elisha Efrat, Demographic Obsession over Jerusalem, NEW
MIDDLE EAST MAG., Apr. 1994, at 30; Michael Freund, Opinion, Bordering on Obses-
sion, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 18, 2002, at 9, available at http://web.israelinsider.com/
Views/1761.htm.
39 See Dov Friedlander, Fertility in Israel: Is the Transition to Replacement
Level in Sight?, in COMPLETING THE FERTILITY TRANSITION 440,441-43 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/completingfertility/Revised
Friedlanderpaper.PDF. See also Ruth Landau, Israel: Every Person has the Right to
Have Children, in THIRD PARTY ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACROSS CULTURES: SOCIAL,
LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 129, 130 (Eric Blyth & Ruth Landau eds., 2004).
40 Friedlander, supra note 39, at 443.
41 ARNON SOFFER, ISRAEL, DEMOGRAPHY 2000-2020: DANGERS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 18 (2001). See also Hasan Abu Nimah, Defusing Israel's "Demo-
graphic Bomb, " ELECTRONIC INTIFADA, Mar. 9 2005 (noting Palestinian population in
Israel and occupied territories exceeds 5.3 million, while the Jewish population is 5.2
million; behind Israel's Green line, the population breaks down as follows: 5.2 mil-
lion Jews, 1.3 million Israeli Arabs, and 290,000 other minorities).
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Fear that Arab encroachment on majority status will create a tip-
ping-point, altering Israel's character as a Jewish State, has led to a
spate of political proposals that may radically reshape this comer of
the Middle East. The withdrawal of settlements in Gaza42 and other
movements toward disengagement 43 from the occupied territories sig-
nal a recognition that Israel's democratic commitments don't square
with the "demographics on the ground." Still, until more dramatic
land reforms occur, the political arithmetic that tallies new-born ba-
bies as a rough proxy for political dominance will continue to focus
attention and garner support for reproductive interventions such as
ART.
B. United States
If Israel's approach to ART reflects a deep commitment to child-
bearing as a cultural imperative, American approaches reflect cultural
allegiances that run in schizophrenic directions. Concern for individ-
ual choice and autonomy, suspicion of government regulation of mar-
ket forces, and disinclination to support non-traditional families com-
bine to create an awkward m6lange of ART policies and procedures.
America's romance with autonomy is linked to its deep commit-
ment to liberal individualism, a philosophy that seeks to maximize
individual liberty. According to this philosophy, individuals should be
granted wide latitude in their activities and barred only from actions
that trench upon the rights of others.44 This expansive view of indi-
vidual agency questions the existence of a societal "common good"
apart from the interests of individual members, and shrinks from
claims made on behalf of the community.45 Government is thinly con-
42 See Israel Completes Gaza Withdrawal, BBC NEWS, Sept. 12, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/4235768.stm (reporting departure of Jewish
settlers and Israeli troops from the Gaza strip thirty-eight years after annexation).
43 See Ariel Sharon s Disengagement Plan, MIDEASTWEB GATEWAY, Apr.
14, 2004, http://www.mideastweb.org/disengagement.htm (proposing withdrawal
from Gaza and four settlements in the West Bank).44 See Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should from Doctors: Rethinking
Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 13 HEALTH MATRIx 235, 238
(2003) (quoting John Stuart Mill's statement, "my right to swing my fist stops at your
nose").
45 Liberalism's emphasis on the individual over the community is well ar-
ticulated by Carlos Ball in distinguishing liberal from communitarian theory. See
Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory in All the Right Places: Feminist and Communi-
tarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 113 (2005).
As Ball notes,
Liberalism views the self as fully constituted prior to its attachments to oth-
ers. In other words, the most important shared capacities of human beings
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ceived 46 as existing primarily to support self-definition by "unencum-
bered" rights-bearing individuals.47 Market regulation and other con-
straints on economic and political actors are viewed with suspicion
and a rights-oriented discourse predominates.48
Bioethics, the field most instrumental in shaping medical ad-
vances, including ART, has particularly strong links to liberal indi-
vidualism. An off-shoot of the civil rights movements of the 1960s,
bioethics was nurtured by the same revolutionary impulses that chal-
lenged the social subordination of blacks and women.49 Animated by a
desire to destabilize existing power structures in the medical sphere,
philosophers, lawyers, and other activists turned their attention to
physician paternalism and patient rights.
Bioethics began by questioning physicians' decisional authority in
the doctor-patient relationship and enhancing patients' rights to de-
termine the course of their care.50 Advancing from that initial beach-
pre-exist relationships with others or membership in groups. Liberal theory,
therefore, views individuals as existing separately and independently from
others. For liberalism, a regime of government and laws must protect what
it views to be a condition of freedom and autonomy that pre-exists the state.
Id.
46 See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (1869) (stating "the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others").
47 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF
A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 12 (1996) (critiquing liberal theories of the self that fail to
recognize constitutive moral obligations to family, tribe, and community. Individuals,
according to Sandel, should be viewed as fundamentally "encumbered" by relational
obligations whose nurturance is also essential for meaningful self-governance).
48 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 14 (1991).
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations,
heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward con-
sensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground. In its
silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the
benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without accepting the
corresponding personal and civic obligations.... In its neglect of civil soci-
ety, it undermines the principal seedbeds of personal and civic virtue.
Id.
49 See Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the
End of Life, 35 HouS. L. REv. 1393, 1398 (1998-1999); ALBERT R. JONSON, THE
BIRTH OF BIOETHICS (1998).
50 All of bioethics' central projects relate to expanding patient capacity for
self-governance. The doctrine of informed consent, probably bioethics' most salient
achievement, divests physicians of the right to make decisions on a patient's behalf
and facilitates patient self-rule by requiring physicians to share sufficient information
to permit patients to make knowing, informed choices. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 787-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The legal and ethical doctrines guiding end-of-life
decision-making strive to maintain decisional power in the hands of competent pa-
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head, bioethics has worked to ensure patients maximal self-
governance in their role as research-subjects, in end-of-life care, 51 and
in the aftermath of medical error. And, while American bioethics has
come under attack for being unduly obsessed with autonomy,5 2 its
individualistic orientation, nonetheless, continues to shape its ap-
proaches to innovations in reproductive technology.
Although powerfully felt preferences for autonomous choice and
unfettered markets are consistent with liberal individualism, these
preferences, in the ART context, hit cross-currents that tug in opposite
directions. Fear that reproductive technology might lead to the over-
throw of traditional family forms pushes toward constraints on ART
use. A laissez-faire ideology that would preserve a free market in
ART delivery and consumption bumps up awkwardly with concerns
about ART's subversive potential. Together, these schizophrenic im-
pulses have led to a relatively unregulated legal environment, pock-
marked by case law and statutory initiatives that accept ART use for
married heterosexuals, but express hostility to the myriad novel family
forms that ART helps bring into being.
The bias against untraditional family forms appears to have deep
historical roots. It mixes traditional gender stereotypes about the abil-
ity of women to function effectively without men with rigid notions
about what children need to grow up happy and healthy. These in-
tients and to ensure decision-making for incompetent patients remains true to their
previously expressed wishes. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 280 (1990). Moves toward physician-assisted suicide are likewise prompted by
concerns that legal impediments should be removed from suffering patients who seek
to determine the time and manner of death. See OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S DEATH wiTH DIGNITY ACT 13 (Katrina Hedberg &
Melvin Kohn eds., 2003), http://egov.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/docs/year5.pdf. The
Supreme Court has deferred to the states in determining whether to approve of or ban
assisted-suicide. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill,
521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997).
51 See Bruce Jennings, The Liberal Neutrality of Living and Dying: Bio-
ethics, Constitutional Law, and Political Theory in the American Right-to-Die De-
bate, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 97,97 (1999).
52 Daniel Callahan, Bioethics: Private Choice and Common Good, 24
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1994, at 28, 28 (criticizing bioethics for its "ten-
dency to reduce the problem of the common good to justice, and the individual moral
life to the gaining of autonomy"). See also Renee C. Fox & Judith P. Swazey, Exam-
ining American Bioethics: Its Problems and Prospects, 14 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 361, 362 (2005) (noting the commonly articulated critique that
American bioethics represents "[t]he 'triumph' of a rational, highly individualistic
conception of autonomy over all other moral principles, and an emphasis on individ-
ual rights, choice, and welfare that outbalances the invocation of responsibilities,
obligations, and duties").
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grained suspicions about female-headed families are woven tightly
into the fabric of modem American society.
Puritan distrust of women raising babies outside the sanctity of
marriage probably immigrated to America during the founding of the
first colonies. Nathaniel Hawthorne's celebrated novel, The Scarlet
Letter, examines the fear and religious zeal that led colonial society to
exclude Hester Pryne and her illegitimate daughter from the benefits
of community. The shame of non-marital childbearing is made literal
by the scarlet letter Hester must wear, and her status as an outsider is
marked by her banishment to a hut at the edge of the wilderness. Hes-
ter has "broken a law of civilization and is constantly in danger of
becoming wild and one with the wilderness. 53
Religious condemnation of unmarried women having sex and
raising families remained constant throughout the nineteenth and early
part of the twentieth century, but the theory that reproduction outside
of marriage was not only spiritually corrupt, but also economically
and culturally self-destructive was not widely disseminated until the
1960s, when the Moynihan Report was published with great fanfare.
In that manifesto, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan identified single-
parenthood as a primary source of the black community's ills, arguing
that, "[T]he Negro community has been forced into a matriarchal
structure which, because it is so out of line with the rest of American
society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole, and
imposes a crushing burden on the Negro male."54
Today, the erosion of the traditional family can no longer be
tagged as any one community's "problem." The social trends of stead-
ily high divorce rates and increases in non-marital child-bearing cut
across all ethnicities and demographics.55 Teen pregnancy, parenting
53 CLAUDIA DURST JOHNSON, UNDERSTANDING THE SCARLET LETTER: A
STUDENT CASEBOOK OF ISSUES, SOURCES, AND HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 40 (1995).
Pearl, Hester's preternaturally intuitive daughter, captures some of the fear and fasci-
nation that mid-nineteenth century American society brought to the issue of illegiti-
mate unions. Mysteriously beautiful, honest, and prescient, Pearl is also wild and
ungovernable. "Pearl, who 'could not be made amenable to rules,' thus grows up
being more at home in the forest than in the town, where she and her mother are both
considered to be freaks. Like the wilderness, she is uncontrollable." Id. at 40 (quoting
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 80 (First Signet Classic Printing
1999) (1959)).
54 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Ac-
tion, in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39, 75 (1967).
55 In 1999, 22 percent of white non-Hispanic women who gave birth were
unmarried. This is up from 9 percent in 1980 and 17 percent in 1990. Forty-two per-
cent of Hispanic women who gave birth were unmarried, which is up from 24 percent
in 1980 and 37 percent in 1990. Sixty-nine percent of black women who gave birth
were unmarried in 1999, which is up from 56 percent in 1980 and 67 percent in 1990.
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among unmarried co-habitants, and child-bearing among single, older
career women have combined to chip away at two-parent families'
majority status. According to the United States Government's Forum
on Child and Family Statistics, in 2004, less than 55 percent of exist-
ing families consisted of a couple and their biological or adoptive
children. 56 Although the actual effects of this social transformation are
unclear, the imagined consequences have prompted lamentations from
numerous quarters.
Religious leaders, social conservatives and fathers' rights advo-
cates all claim that single-mother parenting is responsible for a cas-
cade of social ills, including "teen drug use, urban violence, unem-
ployment, [ ] declining international competitiveness, federal budget
deficits, [ ] individual 'narcissism' [and the] 'collapse of family val-
ues.' 57 Although existing, data suggests poverty, not single-
parenthood, generates poor outcomes for children,58 the current ad-
ministration has launched a crusade to "strengthen families" on the
theory that children raised by a married mom and dad will thrive in
ways that children in single-parent homes will not.59 Current initia-
Stephanie J. Ventura & Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the
United States, 1940-99, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Oct. 2000, at 1, 6, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs4816.pdf.
56 Forum on Child and Family Statistics, America's Children: Key National
Indicators of Well-Being 2005: Family Structure and Children's Living Arrange-
ments, available at http://www.childstats.gov/americaschildren/pop6.asp (last visited
Jan. 31, 2006).
57 Bernie D. Jones, Single Motherhood by Choice: Libertarian Feminism,
and the Uniform Parentage Act, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 419, 431 (2002-2003) (citing
STEPHANIE COONTz, THE WAY WE REALLY ARE: COMING TO TERMS WITH AMERICA'S
CHANGING FAMILIES 6 (1997). See also D. Blankenhorn, FATHERLESS AMERICA:
CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995) (stating, "Father-hunger
is the primary cause of the declining well-being of children in our society and is asso-
ciated with social problems such as teenage pregnancy, child abuse, and domestic
violence against women."). See also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA"), 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (Congressional Findings
stating that "[tihe negative consequences of out-of-wedlock birth ... are well docu-
mented" and include increased likelihood of welfare dependency, increased risks of
low birth weight, poor cognitive development, child abuse and neglect, and teenage
parenthood, and decreased likelihood of having an intact marriage during adulthood).
58 See MELISSA LUDTKE, ON OUR OWN: UNMARRIED MOTHERHOOD IN
AMERICA 422-23 (1997) ( pointing out that children raised by financially stable, older
mothers will likely not suffer the behavioral difficulties and poor outcomes identified
with the children of poor, adolescent single moms).
59 A press release issued by the White House in 2002 outlined the Bush
Administration's welfare policy and stated,
Children reared by married parents in intact families are more likely to
complete high school and are less likely to be poor, to commit crimes, or to
have mental health problems than are children reared in single-parent fami-
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tives to encourage marriage and decrease out-of-wedlock births in-
clude tax relief,60 a one and a half billion dollar "healthy marriages
campaign, 6 1 and a host of carefully tailored state subsidies.62
lies. It is no criticism of single parents to acknowledge the better outcomes
for children of married-couple families. Rather, it is simply wise and pru-
dent to reorient our policies to encourage marriage, especially when chil-
dren are involved.
Press Release, Pres. George W. Bush, Working Toward Independence 2 (Feb. 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-
book.pdf.
60 Tax laws not only encourage marriage, but also encourage a marriage
where one spouse is the breadwinner and the other is the homemaker. "For [flamilies
with two earners, joint [filing] requires an accounting of who comes first" (e.g., the
primary and secondary earner). The secondary earner (generally the wife) is taxed at a
higher rate. Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferred by Law: The Disappearance of the Tradi-
tional Family and Law's Refusal to Let It Go, 25 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 125, 127
(2004). In addition, married workers with non-earning spouses (or spouses with sig-
nificantly lower earnings) receive a bonus and have a lower tax liability than single,
equal earning workers. The current system, thus, creates an incentive for couples to
conform to the traditional family model. Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for
Social Policy, 11 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 307, 309 n.7 (2004). Although single parents
are eligible for a higher standard deduction if they file as head of household, rather
than if they file as single, they do not receive as many exemptions and deductions as a
married couple filing jointly, where one spouse does not work outside the home.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL'N No. 501, EXEMPTIONS, STANDARD DEDUCTION,
AND FILING INFORMATION 7 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p50l.pdf. The policies behind these benefits are clear. In a press conference an-
nouncing the top priorities of the 109th Congress, one Senator stated,
I think making the marriage tax relief permanent is, obviously, of the high-
est priority .... People felt better about getting married and having their
families when we had marriage tax relief and child tax credits.... We want
people to know that their taxes, when they get married, are going to stay the
way they are now.
Transcript: GOP Legislative Agenda, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A33106-2005Jan24 (last visited Jan. 14,
2006).
61 The money will finance training "to help couples develop interpersonal
skills that sustain 'healthy marriages."' Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush
Plans $1.5 Billion Drive for Promotion of Marriage, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at
At.
62 The federal government carefully oversees the states' aims through
PRWORA, which requires that every state must specify annual numerical goals for
decreasing its number of single pregnancies, and devise and explain its plan for pre-
venting and reducing the number of out-of-wedlock pregnancies. Parvin R. Huda,
Singled Out: A Critique of the Representation of Single Motherhood in Welfare Dis-
course, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 341, 344-45 (2001). The Act "funds state
programs designed to encourage marriage and two-parent families, and is so broadly
worded that the programs need not be targeted exclusively to needy families, but can
instead aim to reach non-needy families as well." Hamilton, supra note 60, at 310 n.8.
Hungry for federal dollars, states have implemented a host of programs in step with
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The current multi-pronged plan to discourage families that fail to
track the "married with children" model reflects the deeply embedded
belief that alternative family forms disadvantage children and degrade
the quality of our communal moral life. As non-traditional families
increase in both number and visibility, our culturally driven impulse
to honor choice and autonomy in intimate life choices bumps up
against a visceral distaste for social chimeras that combine singleton
status and reproduction in unconventional ways. This tension, salient
in existing ART policies, explains why the ability to access and enjoy
the benefits of ART in the United States is influenced, in part, by
marital status and the type of family one seeks to create.
II. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED
STATES
A. Israel
Israel's pronatalism is evidenced by the sheer volume of fertility
assistance taking place within its borders. Boasting more fertility
clinics per capita than any other nation,63 the percentages of ART-
assisted births in Israel far exceeds that of other nations.' Data
collected between 1993 and 1996 reveals that 2 percent of all Israeli
births in that three-year span were a product of in vitro fertilization.
During that same period, IVF births in the United States were 0.2
65percent of all births, ten times lower than the rate in Israel. More
recent data shows Israeli usage of ART to be steadily increasing.
Currently, Israel provides 3,400 IVF treatments per one million
people, boosting the percentage of test-tube babies born to a
PRWORA's goals of "end[ing] the dependency of needy parents on government
benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage . . . , prevent[ing] and
reduce[ing] the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies .... and encourag[ing] the
formation and maintenance of two-parent families." 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. I 1994).
For example, in West Virginia, parents on welfare are eligible to receive bonuses for
raising children as married couples. Jones, supra note 57, at 430.
63 See KANAANEH, supra note 27, at 37. Israel has four times as many fertility
clinics as the U.S. SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, RABBIS AND REPRODUCTION: THE USES OF
NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AMONG ULTRAORTHODOX JEWS IN ISRAEL 2
(1998), available at http://www.brandeis.edu/hbi/wp3.pdf. See also KAHN, supra note
26, at 2.
64 See also KAHN, supra note 26, at 2.
65 See Ruth Landau, Religiosity, Nationalism and Human Reproduction: The
Case of Israel, 23 INT'L J. SOCIOLOGY & SOC. POL'Y, 64, 68 (2003).
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whopping 5 percent.66 These numbers do not include women who
pursue parenthood via donor insemination because records of this
group's usage are not kept. Anecdotal data, however, suggests that the
numbers of ART-assisted births using this less complex form of
medical intervention remain high.67
Israelis resort to ART in such high numbers, in part, because the
Israeli government heavily subsidizes their choice. Prior to 1996, in-
surance coverage for health care in Israel was voluntary and incom-
plete. Employers provided access to the "Sick Funds" authorized to
provide care, but some Israelis, and a larger number of unemployed
Arabs, could not obtain coverage. 68 With the passage of the National
Health Insurance Law, healthcare became compulsory and universal.
Funding for the provision of care comes from employers, the govern-
ment and subscribers in the form of deductibles and caps on particular
treatments.69 Although care is explicitly rationed, all citizens have
access to a basic package.
Remarkably, this basic package includes unlimited fertility treat-
ments of all types, up to the birth of two living children. 70 This benefit
is available to both single and married women, and is limited only by
conditions designed to enhance medical success. 7 This financial sup-
port is part of a larger government package that seeks to shift the sub-
stantial financial burden of raising children from couples and indi-
viduals to the State, thereby spreading the costs of reproduction to the
community at large.72 Single parents, in particular, receive a series of
66 See Nicky Blackburn, supra note 15. Currently, 1VF accounts for 5 percent
of babies born in Israel. Id. One percent of babies born in the U.S. were artificially
conceived. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Division of Reproductive Health:
Activities-ART Surveillance System, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/DRHI
activites/ART.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
67 KAHN, supra note 26, at 2.
68 See Revital Gross, Implementing Health Care Reform in Israel: Organiza-
tional Response to Perceived Incentives, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 659, 664
(2003).
69 Id.
70 National Health Insurance Law art. 12 § 5.2 (1995), http://www.un.org/
esa/gopher-data/ga/cedaw/1 7/country/israel/C-ISR-P3.EN (last visited Nov. 19,
2005).
71 For women using their own ova, the maximum age allowed is forty-five;
for women using donated ova, the maximum age is fifty-one. Regulations require that
the total number of treatment cycles not exceed six per year. Landau, supra note 65,
at 70.
72 For example, in 1968, Israel created the "Fund for Encouraging Birth,"
which offered low-interest loans to young couples seeking to expand their families.
These funds, originally available to all Israelis, was later limited to families "who
have relatives who have served in the Israeli army," effectively excluding the Israeli
Arabs who had been its former primary recipients. See PORTUGUESE, supra note 13, at
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tax, mortgage, rent, and other subsidies designed to render child-
rearing on one salary feasible.
The extension of Israeli pronatalism to unpartnered women was
explicitly endorsed by the Aloni Commission, an expert body empan-
elled by the Ministry of Justice to explore the legal, social, ethical,
and religious issues raised by reproductive technology. Faced with the
question of whether the financial benefits available to incentivize
child-bearing ought to be selectively disbursed to married women
only, the Aloni Commission concluded that disbursement should be
universal and that non-traditional family-formation was consistent
with existing Israeli norms and values.
The Commission prefaced its findings by acknowledging limits to
the entitlements that ART-seeking individuals could claim. While
beginning with the premise that privacy rights are central to any "pro-
gressive society," the Commission acknowledged that "the right to
privacy does not obligate the State to allow innovative reproductive or
genetic engineering techniques which may injure the child-to-be or
prejudice the fundamental principles of society or delicate fabric of
society., 73 In deciding what level of access was consistent with pre-
serving the "delicate fabric of society, 74 the Commission determined
all individuals should have the opportunity to pursue parenthood
through ART and deemed marital status an irrelevant consideration in
recognizing individual rights to "privacy and intimacy in their per-
sonal lives."75 Thus, in Israel, single parenthood is not seen as fraying
the nation's moral fiber, but as a life choice consistent with regnant
social values that support child-bearing.
That Government support for ART remains strong, despite its
flouting of traditional family forms, is particularly remarkable given
ART's uneasy relationship with Halacha (Jewish law) and the promi-
nent role of religious authorities in shaping secular policy. In Israel,
rabbinic courts have exclusive jurisdiction over questions of personal
status including marriage, divorce, child custody and adoption. Addi-
tionally, religious values are disproportionately visible and influential
97 (discussing Israel's Law for Families Blessed with Children, which provided fi-
nancial benefits to families having at least four children). See also KANAANEH, supra
note 27, at 35-36. Other benefits remain available to single Jewish women with three
or more children, including advantageous mortgage rates, rent supplements, reduced
kindergarten fees, social security allowances, tax exemptions, reductions in municipal
property taxes, and discounted payments to National Health Funds. KAHN, supra note
26, at 16.
73 ISRAEL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE REPORT OF THE PUBLIC-PROFESSIONAL
COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION 12 (1994).
74 id.
71 Id. at 17.
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in legislative debates due to the swing-vote power that religious par-
ties enjoy in Parliamentary politics. Without the support of conserva-
tive religious parties, the reigning secular leadership-usually Labor
or the Likud-loses the votes necessary to maintain power. Conse-
quently, religious parties exert more control than their sheer numbers
would suggest and they play their valuable political chips when issues
of religious significance come before them.76
One might imagine that religious authorities would insist on a re-
strictive approach to ART use because certain aspects are highly prob-
lematic under Jewish law. First, most ART techniques require male
masturbation, which violates the strict prohibition against "hotza'at
zera levatalah"-"emission of seed other than within the context of
sanctioned sexual activity. '77 More importantly, use of donor sperm
threatens to create children who might be stigmatized as mamzers
(bastards). Mamzers, children of incestuous or adulterous relations,
are social outcasts who are denied marital relations with all but other
mamzers. If a married woman were to use Jewish donor sperm, it
could be argued that her child was a mamzer because the biological
parents consist of a married woman and a man not her husband. Addi-
tionally, a single woman using anonymous donor sperm could have a
child who marries the child of another single woman who used the
same donor. Those children would be half siblings and their progeny
would be mamzers.
Although some rabbis have gone on record against the use of
ART, others have devised ingenious ways around the apparent hala-
chic prohibitions.78 Some have interpreted the prohibitions against
adultery to exclude the union of egg and sperm accomplished through
medical manipulation.79 Others have suggested that if single women
use non-Jewish donor sperm their grandchildren need not suffer the
76 PORTUGUESE, supra note 13, at 47-51.
77 Yoel Jakobovits, Assisted Reproduction Through the Prism of Jewish Law,
JEWISH ACTION, Spring 2005, at 26, 27.
78 Id.
Most rabbinic authorities maintain that [the hotza 'at zera levatalah] restric-
tions are overridden when the sperm is procured for procreative purposes.
Where cancer chemotherapy might cause infertility, some, though not all,
authorities even permit banking the sperm of an unmarried man for future
use, since he also has the mitzvah of procreation. The preferred method is
collection of semen during marital relations. Impregnation during the nid-
dah period should be avoided. If otherwise impossible, however, Rav
Moshe Feinstein permits Al where ovulation occurs before the woman goes
to the mikvah.
Id. (citations omitted).
79 See D. KELLY WEISBERG, THE BIRTH OF SURROGACY IN ISRAEL 193 (2005).
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threat of mamzer-status because a non-Jewish donor's lineage is con-
sidered "neutral;" that is, siblings of the same non-Jewish father
would, nonetheless, not be considered halachically related to one an-
other.80 Although some rabbis contend that the absence of a clear Ha-
lachic bar should not foster too lenient an attitude from the rabbinic
community,81 in fact, there has been no organized resistance to bur-
geoning ART use within the Conservative or Orthodox religious
82
community.
Governmental support, abetted by tacit acquiescence on the part
of the religious community, does not come free, however. Women
seeking to avail themselves of state assistance in their quest to procre-
ate must submit to extensive intrusion and control. According to Min-
istry of Health regulations, women seeking donor insemination must
be above the age of thirty, but below the age of fifty, and must partici-
pate in a screening interview with a government social worker de-
signed to assess their psychological and financial aptitude for mother-
hood.83 Eligibility hinges on the social worker's evaluation of the
woman's attitudes and attributes. Under scrutiny are the aspiring
mother's emotional capability, relationship stability, understanding of
the responsibilities being assumed, state of health, support systems,
motivation to become a mother, self-image, and future vision of the
family.84 Although biological parenthood is usually considered be-
yond the ambit of state intervention, the route to donor insemination
80 See Jakobovits, supra note 77, at 27.
81 KAHN, supra note 26, at 57 (noting objections of the Israeli conservative
rabbi, David Golinkin, that ART use among single women undermines the "holy
family" which is "still the most important thing").
82 Id. at 58-59 (discussing fertility clinics' decision not to maintain data on
the numbers of single women pursuing ART for fear that the Rabbanut, if made con-
scious of its wide-spread usage, might grow concerned about unintentionally incestu-
ous unions from the progeny of anonymous sperm donors. As one fertility doctor
explained, "[t]he less said about this phenomenon [(single women using ART)] the
better it will be for the fertility doctors and for the unmarried women who seek artifi-
cial insemination.").
83 KAHN, supra note 26, at 28. The requirement that women be at least age
thirty before receiving donor insemination is designed to ensure that they have pur-
sued alternative paths to motherhood with adequate zeal and that resulting offspring
have the chance to achieve adulthood before maternal decrepitude sets in. Id Origi-
nally, Health Ministry regulations required single women be interviewed and evalu-
ated by a psychiatrist and a social worker, requirements not imposed on married
women. Id. at 81. In 1996, an unmarried woman challenged the regulations on the
grounds that they discriminated based on marital status. Id. The petition was success-
ful, and the regulations were revised. Id. at 83. The revised regulations retained the
social worker evaluation for all women, married and unmarried. Id. The psychiatric
evaluation requirement was eliminated. Id.
84 Id. at 28.
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more closely resembles adoption proceedings. Would-be parents are
vetted to determine their suitability for the task.85 As one social
worker noted,
This is a government service. The government is supplying
the sperm and we are given the mandate of deciding who is fit
and who is not.... There are women for whom it would be a
tragedy to have a child as a single parent and it is our job to
tell them this.86
Once eligibility is determined, most women seek assistance from
public clinics where patient privacy is accorded little respect and
sperm is selected for them by attending physicians or nurses. As de-
scribed by Susan Kahn in her foundational analysis of assisted repro-
duction in Israel, "Most Israeli fertility clinics ... were busy and un-
adorned, much like other public healthcare clinics in Israel.... Doors
were left ajar during examinations, diagnoses were yelled across wait-
ing rooms, prescriptions were announced loudly. 87 Nurses and doc-
tors gave advice to patients, "as if they were speaking to their own
cherished, yet somehow errant, children., 88 By law, donor identity
must remain anonymous and women are given little information or
ability to select for characteristics beyond European or North Afri-
can/Asian origin.89 Women are encouraged to choose donors who
share their coloration-"light/Ashkenazi" or "dark/Sephardic." 90 In
this way, "mixed" progeny are avoided, recognizable ethnic categories
are perpetuated, and the offspring of these "matches" can be com-
fortably slotted into existing niches in Israeli society.91
85 See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive
Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 917, 954 (1991) (discussing
screening mechanisms of adoption agencies).
86 KAHN, supra note 26, at 28-29. Despite these intrusive interviews, the
state's screening filter appears extremely porous. Few women are actually denied
permission to proceed, despite precarious economic or social circumstances. Only
women in desperate financial straits or with clear emotional pathologies are denied
the benefits of parenthood. Id. at 32.
87 Id. at 25.
88 Id. at 25.
89 Id. at 33.
The matchmaking element surrounding sperm selection for unmarried
women extends directly into matching the donor and recipient's Jewish eth-
nicity, which interestingly is assumed to be either Ashkenazi or Sephardi,
either "light" or "dark," despite the fact that many Jews in Israel are of
mixed ethnic origins.
Id. at 36.
90 Id.
9' Id at 34-39.
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The trade-offs in Israel's ART practices are clear. Women's re-
productive ambitions are legitimated through the financial and moral
support of the state. But, in proffering this support, the State trans-
forms these procreative efforts from a private life quest into a public
works project. Women seeking donor sperm are conceptualized and
treated not as consumers pursuing private preferences, but as citizens
engaged with the State in a communal baby-making enterprise. Just as
shoppers at a government-run food-store in China or Russia in the
1950s would likely face long lines and limited selection, Israeli
women seeking ART through government clinics find their choices
limited and their intimacies revealed. Though state involvement
brings an assembly-line, production mentality to the highly personal
business of choosing sperm and achieving conception, it makes child-
bearing possible for the many modest-income women who might oth-
erwise find their dreams of parenthood out of reach.
B. United States
ART treatment and funding is handled very differently in the
United States. These differences reflect America's more penurious
conception of the proper role of government in providing healthcare
and a basic ambivalence about the degree to which the quest for par-
enthood, via technological innovation, should be supported through
public subsidies. Unlike Israel, which includes ART treatment as part
of the basic package of health benefits guaranteed by the government,
ART expenses are viewed in the United States primarily as a luxury
expenditure, the costs of which should be shouldered primarily by
fertility consumers, themselves.
With the exception of Medicare and Medicaid, healthcare in the
United States is privately provided. Healthcare in America is not
conceived of as a moral right, but as a good like any other-available
for purchase, if the funds exist. Private insurance coverage is shaped
by a variety of factors, none of which are perfectly synchronized.
Market forces and the preferences of contracting employers,
individual subscribers, physician groups, hospitals, and insurance
providers mold the terms and conditions under which healthcare
services are financed and delivered. Courts exercise some oversight
when private insurance arrangements appear to violate civil rights or
run afoul of basic tort law duties.92 And, state legislatures impose
92 Judicial oversight of managed care organizations (MCOs) is greatly hin-
dered by the federal ERISA statute, which preempts suits related to the administration
of employer-provided benefits, including benefits due under employer-sponsored
health plans. Lawsuits challenging MCO decisions that have led to the provision of
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funding mandates, reflecting popular sentiment about the type of
medical care that should be offered independent of their ability to pay.
Lobbying efforts to expand coverage for particular conditions reflect
both interest-group activity and broad-based sympathy for the type of
care and category of patient involved. For example, after HMO efforts
to shrink costs led to reduced hospital-stay coverage for new mothers,
consumer groups successfully lobbied for the enactment of laws in
twenty-nine states mandating insurers extend coverage for post-birth
hospitals stays.93 Infertility advocacy groups have pressed for similar
laws requiring coverage of ART in employee-sponsored benefit plans,
but their efforts have been only partially successful.
Existing state legislation is a patchwork, with less than a quarter
of the nation's states requiring various levels of ART coverage. Some
states provide coverage for IVF, but may exclude other related ART
treatments. Other states exclude IVF while providing coverage for less
expensive measures. Still others require insurers to tell employers
about infertility coverage, but do not require employers to include
such coverage in the plans they actually purchase. 94
sub-standard healthcare have been interpreted as suits relating to eligibility and plan
administration, and, thus, within ERISA's preemptive reach. See, e.g., Aetna Health,
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); and Aaron Kesselheim & Troyen A. Brennan,
The Swinging Pendulum: The Supreme Court Reverses Course on ERISA and Man-
aged Care, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y. L. & ETHics 451 (2005).
93 David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer Protection"
Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5, 24 (1999).
94 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-86-118 (2005), ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-
137 (2005) (requiring all health insurers that cover maternity benefits to also cover in
vitro fertilization with the exception of HMO providers); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 1374.55 (West 2000) (requiring certain insurers to offer infertility diagnosis
and treatment to employers, however the law does not require those insurers to pro-
vide the coverage, nor does it require employers to purchase the additional coverage
for their employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West 2005) (requiring
health insurers to offer infertility diagnosis and treatment to employers); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 431:1OA- 116.5 (1993), HAW. REv. STAT. § 432:1-604 (1993) (requiring cer-
tain insurance plans to provide a one-time only benefit for outpatient costs resulting
from IVF); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m (West 1993), ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
125/5-3 (West 1993) (requiring certain insurance policies to cover costs of diagnosis
and treatment of infertility); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-8 10 (West 2002), MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-706 (West 2005) (requiring those insurance policies that
provide pregnancy-related benefits to also cover outpatient costs of IVF); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (West 2005), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176A, § 8K
(West 2005), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4 (West 2005), 211 MASS. CODE
REGs. 37.03-37.07 (1987) (requiring HMO's and insurers that cover pregnancy-
related benefits to also cover infertility diagnosis and treatment expenses); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 33-22-1521 (2005) (requiring HMO's to cover infertility costs as part of
basic preventive health case services); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-46.lx (West Supp.
2005), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J4.23 (West Supp. 2005), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17: 48-6x
[Vol. 16:65
CULTURAL PRIORITIES REVEALED
Even in states with generous mandates, state magnanimity is lim-
ited to ART candidates whose successful treatment would create a
family according to traditional definitions. Hidden within the statutes'
facially neutral language are hurdles for single or lesbian women who
would avail themselves of the state's largesse to create non-traditional
families. The first hurdle lies in the statutes' initial definition of infer-
tility. Most states define infertility as "the inability to conceive a
pregnancy or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or more
of regular sexual relations without contraception." 95 For lesbians and
single women who could become pregnant through sexual intercourse
but are seeking physician assistance in conceiving via intrauterine
insemination, establishing the condition of "infertility" may be impos-
sible. A similar catch-22 emerges in states conditioning insurance
benefits on a showing that the infertility treatment is "medically nec-
essary. 96 Again, lesbians and single women may be medically capa-
ble of conception, but require artificial insemination with donor sperm
to satisfy a personal rather than medical need.
The statutes' specification of who is qualified to participate in
covered IVF procedures constitutes a second hurdle. Arkansas, Ha-
waii, and Texas have mandated that insurers cover IVF, but eligibility
is limited to women being fertilized with their spouse's sperm. Con-
sequently, even if gay and single women can show that intensive
technological therapy is medically necessary, they are excluded from
insurance coverage as a result of their use of donor sperm to create a
non-marital family unit.
(West Supp. 2005) (requiring certain insurance policies to cover the costs of infertility
diagnosis and treatment); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221(k)(6) (McKinney 2000 & Supp.
2005), N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(s) (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2005) (requiring insurers
to cover the diagnosis and treatment of correctable medical conditions, however IVF
is excluded from this requirement); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.01 (LexisNexis
2005) (requiring HMO's to cover basic preventive health services, including infertil-
ity); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2002), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-23 (2002), R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 27-20-20 (2002), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-41-33 (2002) (requiring HMO's and
insurers that cover pregnancy services to also cover the costs of medically necessary
infertility diagnosis and treatment); and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25A-2 (LexisNexis
2003) (requiring HMO's to cover basic health care services, which sometimes in-
cludes infertility services).
95 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2000). See also 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m (West 1993); and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27-46.1x (West
Supp. 2005).
96 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01 (LexisNexis 2004); and MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (West 2005), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176A, §
8K (West 2005), MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4J (West 2005), 211 MASS.
CODE REGS. 37.03-37.07 (1987).
2006]
HEALTH MATRIX
On the other hand, if lesbians and single women can pay for ART
out-of-pocket, they can proceed through the sperm selection process
unimpeded by the intrusions foisted upon their Israeli counterparts. In
the United States, single and gay women seeking donor insemination
are treated like any woman seeking biological parenthood. No audi-
tion for the job is required; rather, they pay their money and proceed,
untrammeled by social work interviews or screening procedures. 97
Sperm collection and provision in the United States is a private func-
tion, with multiple sperm banks competing for women's business by
providing detailed medical and social profiles of each donor. Women
may learn a prospective donor's college grades, high-school sport,
favorite food, and long-term life-goals. 9 Some companies even make
audio tapes available in which a donor is encouraged to talk about his
reasons for donating and speculate about whether he would be willing
to meet prospective off-spring when they turn eighteen.99 Women
engaged in sperm-shopping on the internet might well think they had
inadvertently clicked onto an on-line dating site, where the market
imperatives of product differentiation and branding have created diz-
zying selection opportunities and dilemmas.
Access to ART in the United States is highly stratified. Those of
modest means often find obtaining access to high-tech services costly
and difficult. But, with the right amount of money, access to ART and
choice in donor gametes can be obtained in the sensitive, pampering
atmosphere of a Barneys' boutique. In Israel, the government store is
crowded and sells only two varieties. In America, a personal shopper
is likely available to bring one hundred different samples to your door.
In Israel, everyone can enter the store but in America, only the
97 Fertility physicians, however, may withhold their services from women
they feel are ill-suited or unprepared for motherhood, and thus, an informal screening
process may occur at the bedside between doctor and patient. See The Ethics Comm.
of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Health, Child-Rearing Ability and The Provision of
Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564, 564 (2004) (determining that
"[f]ertility programs may withhold services from prospective patients on the basis of
well-substantiated judgments that those patients will be unable to provide or have
others provide adequate child-rearing for offspring"). Additionally, some fertility
physicians refuse to service single women and lesbians. This practice of patient selec-
tion may run afoul of existing civil rights legislation. See Benitez v. North Coast
Women's Care Med. Group, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th 978 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). See
also Elliot Spagat, Appeals Court Hears Case of Lesbian Denied Fertility Treatment,
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 11, 2005, available at http://www.mercurynews.com/
mld/mercurynews/news/local/states/califomia/northemcalifornia/1 2875684.htm.
98 See, e.g., California Cryobank, Donor Profiles, http://www.cryobank.com/
Profile.cfm?page=41 &sub=72 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
99 See, e.g., California Cryobank, Donor Audio Interviews, http://cryobank.
com/taped.cfm?page=4 1 &sub=74 (last visited Nov. 19, 2005).
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financially comfortable can shoulder the extravagance of a personal
shopper.
Although American women may proceed absent state intervention
(or assistance) in selecting, purchasing, and using sperm to become
parents, their status as autonomous consumers becomes precarious
once they seek to preserve the integrity of their ART-created families
in the face of external challenges. Whereas state law recognizes the
familial bonds and boundaries of families created by married women
using donor sperm, the family relationships created by single women
have not received the same degree of deference.
Cases dating from the early days of ART technology set the tone
for judicial opinions to come. These cases looked unsympathetically
upon the aspirations of single women and lesbians to raise children on
their own. In C.M v. C.C., a 1977 New Jersey case, the court, unaided
by statutory guidance, granted visitation rights to a known sperm do-
nor who conceived a child with an unmarried woman. 00 Unabashed in
its support for traditional family models, the court grounded its deci-
sion in a judicial policy "favoring the requirement that a child be pro-
vided with a father as well as a mother."' 0 ' The birth mother charac-
terized the donor as a friend or acquaintance who, she expected,
would simply be "a visitor in her home-much as any of her other
friends."' 1 2 The donor characterized his relationship with the birth
mother as intimate and romantic and stated that he anticipated he
would assume a parental role toward any resulting progeny. 0 3 Ignor-
ing the birth mother's intent and expectations, the court found she
"had a long-standing dating relationship" with the donor and "no one
else ... was in a position to take upon himself the responsibilities of
fatherhood when the child was conceived.' 1 4 Operating on the pre-
sumption that "[i]t is in a child's best interests to have two parents
whenever possible," the court supplied a second parent over the
strenuous objections of the birth mother. 0 5 Paying little attention to
the birth mother's understanding of the family she was creating, the
court held that the donor's "consent and active participation in the
procedure leading to conception ... place[ed] upon him the responsi-
bilities [-and also the privileges-] of fatherhood."' 10 6
.. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977).
'o' Id. at 824.
102 Id. at 822.
103 Id.
4 Id. at 824.
'05 Id. at 825.
106 Id.
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A statute of the same 1970s vintage similarly ignored the possibil-
ity that unmarried women might be drawn to ART's possibilities. Al-
though drafted to formalize familial relations and confer substantive
equality on children regardless of their parent's marital status, 1°7 the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), as originally written, failed to discuss
unmarried women's use of ART, leaving them vulnerable to parental
claims by donors.
Section 5 of the UPA made clear that a married woman
inseminating with donor sperm under the supervision of a physician
need not worry about a donor asserting parental rights. The Act
specified that a consenting husband is the legal father and the donor is
simply the donor-not a father-in the eyes of the law. 10 8 The Act,
however, did not address donor status when an unmarried woman
sought to use the sperm. This omission left judges vast discretion to
welcome donors into the nuclear family that unmarried women
thought they had secured.
Some states, in an effort to expand the protection provided by the
UPA to unmarried, as well as married women, omitted the word
"married" from their state statutes protecting women who inseminated
using donor sperm. Thus, some state legislatures adopted language
clarifying that a donor who is not the husband of the birth mother
"shall have no right, obligation or interest with respect to a child born
as a result of the artificial insemination."' 0 9 Despite legislative intent
to bring single women within the protective fold previously reserved
107 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 378, 378-79 (1973).
Since 1968, a series of decisions rendered by the United States Supreme
Court under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution has mandated equal legal treatment of legitimate and illegiti-
mate children in a broad range of substantive areas, one exception being the
right of intestate succession.... [1In providing substantive legal equality for
all children regardless of the marital status of their parents, the present Act
merely fulfills the mandate of the Constitution.
Id.
108 Id. at § 5.
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not
her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of
a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and
signed by him and his wife.... The donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than
the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a
child thereby conceived.
Id.
109 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5405 (2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 555
(2005); and OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (2003).
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for married couples, judges preferred to maintain single women's
vulnerability in the face of donor claims, and proved unable to
implement the bright-line bar to donor intrusion that the statutes
appear to contemplate.
In Jhordan C. v. Mary K.," the California appellate court was
called upon to interpret a statute,"' that, like the UPA, stated that a
married woman inseminated with donor sperm, with the consent of
her husband and under the supervision of a physician, could be certain
that her husband was the legal father and that the donor would have
no parental rights."12 The statute also specified that donors could claim
no paternal rights."13 Focusing on the reference to physician supervi-
sion, the donor maintained that because he had provided his semen
directly to the birth mother without the intercession of a physician, the
statute's bar to donor parental rights did not apply. 1 4 Additionally, the
donor argued he had donated his semen in reliance on an agreement
with the birth mother that he would be permitted to assume parental
rights and responsibilities." 5 The birth mother denied the existence of
any such agreement, characterized the statute's discussion of physi-
cian involvement as merely hortatory and argued that the statutory
intent to clearly exclude donors from parental status should guide the
court's decision."
16
The birth mother argued that any reading of the California statute
that would provide unmarried women less protection than married
women violated the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution. Be-
cause other paternity statutes preclude donor paternity claims when a
married woman undergoes artificial insemination with semen not pro-
vided to a physician, the birth mother asserted that Equal Protection
requires unmarried mothers receive the same protection.1 7 While ac-
cepting the factual claim that a network of state statutes protects mar-
ried, but not unmarried women, from donor paternity claims, the court
rejected the Equal Protection claim outright.118 Married and unmarried
... 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
.. Id. at 531. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1975) (repealed 1994); now
codified in CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 2005) ("If, under the supervision of a li-
censed physician ... and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated arti-
ficially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law
as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.").
12 Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
j3Id. at 534.
114 See id.
15 Id. at 532.
116 Id. at 532-35.
117 Id. at 535-37.
.. Id. at 535-36.
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women, the court seemed to say, are not equally situated when it
comes to the protection their ART-assisted families deserve. Support-
ing this conclusion, the court maintained:
In the case of a married woman, the marital relationship in-
vokes a long-recognized social policy of preserving the integ-
rity of the marriage.... No such concerns arise where there is
no marriage at all. Equal protection is not violated by provid-
ing that certain benefits or legal rights arise only out of the
marital relationship." 19
While the court insisted its decision made no statement about the de-
sirability of non-traditional families, 120 it is difficult not to read the
court's language as preferring families that include a dad, regardless
of the birth mother's desires or intent.
Similar biases are obvious in McIntyre v. Crouch,12' an Oregon
case that also involved a filiation action by a sperm donor who
provided semen directly to an unmarried woman. Like the California
statute, the Oregon statute clearly specified that the consenting
husband of a married woman was the legal father of any child born
through artificial insemination using donor sperm. Further, it provided
limited protection for unmarried women by stating that a sperm
donor-not the birth mother's husband-shall "have no right,
obligation or interest with respect to a child born as a result of the
artificial insemination.',
122
The court understood the statute's aims to include "allow[ing] an
unmarried woman to conceive and bear a child without sexual inter-
course" and clarifying "an unmarried mother is freed of any claims by
the donor of parental rights."' 23 Despite this grasp of legislative intent,
the court chose to invade the safe harbor offered to single women.
Troubled by the donor's claim that "he gave [respondent] his semen
... in reliance on an agreement... that he 'would remain active' in
the child's life," a claim the birth mother categorically denied, the
court found that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution forbids
any statutory reading that would categorically bar a biological father's
efforts to assert the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood. 24 Refer-
119 Id. at 536 (internal citations omitted).
120 Id. at 537 (stating "We wish to stress that our opinion in this case is not
intended to express any judicial preference toward traditional notions of family struc-
ture or toward providing a father where a single woman has chosen to bear a child.").121 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
122 Id. at 242.
123 Id. at 243.
124 Id. at 241.
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encing case law dealing with the rights of nonmarital, biological fa-
thers who sire children through sexual intercourse, the court held that
the Due Process Clause protects an "unwed father" who "demon-
strates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child.... ,,125 Ignor-
ing the possibility that a donor might initially liken his function to that
of a blood donor but later change his mind, the court held that a donor
who could establish the existence of a pre-conception agreement to
share parental responsibilities would receive the support of the Ore-
gon courts. 12 6 As one judge wrote in dissent, the majority's creation of
a Trojan horse bringing donors within the legal walls women thought
protected their family units "turns [a] statutory policy [designed to]
assur[e] the stability of all the parties' lives" into a "house of sand.,
127
Courts in Colorado have similarly chosen to eviscerate the protec-
tion conferred by its legislature. Following California and Oregon's
lead, Colorado adopted the UPA, but also omitted the word "married."
Thus, Colorado, like California, sought to "provide a legal mechanism
for married and unmarried women to obtain a supply of semen for use
in artificial insemination." 128 The statute's protective reach, however,
was drastically curtailed by a judicial reading that excluded known
sperm donors and unmarried women from its application. Ruminating
over the drafters' intent, the court surmised that the UPA's authors
clearly meant to bar donor claims where married women or anony-
mous donors were involved. 129 They could not believe, however, that
UPA drafters intended to universally reject claims of non-anonymous
donors who had agreed to provide sperm to -unmarried women.
130
Surely, the court opined, donor expectations and post-agreement con-
duct were relevant to a determination of parental rights if the mother
is unmarried or the donor is known. The statute, though, makes no
125 Id. at 245.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 248 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
The statutes contemplate that the ultimate relationship, or absence of one,
must be defined before the child is conceived in order to facilitate informed
decisions about whether to donate and to conceive. The statutory policy as-
sures the stability of all the parties' lives in the aftermath of the decisions.
The holding of the lead opinion turns the statutory scheme into a house of
sand.
Id.
128 In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 30 (Colo. 1989).
129 Id. at 33.
130 Id. at 33-34 ("The role of an agreement between the parties under the
model UPA and section 19-4-106 is least clearly understood when the semen donor is
known and the recipient is unmarried.").
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mention of such factors and appears to abjure this sort of weighing
and balancing.' Despite the breadth of the statute's text-devised
explicitly to include unmarried women within its scope-the court
held, "the General Assembly neither considered nor intended to affect
the rights of known donors who gave their semen to unmarried
women for use in artificial insemination with the agreement that the
donor would be the father of any child so conceived.' 32 Once again, a
sperm donor claiming an agreement to co-parent was allowed to press
parental claims, despite the clear language of the statute.
Although the single women in these cases uniformly deny the ex-
istence of a pre-conception agreement, courts are eager to provide
donors a forum in which to push for a place at the family table. When
male claims for involvement with biological progeny come face to
face with a women's privacy, the women's privacy claims consis-
tently give way. Their rhetoric to the contrary, American judges re-
flect their culture's zeitgeist-which is riven with anxiety about non-
traditional families. Given an opportunity to knit together a man and a
woman to assume joint care for a biologically related child, courts will
respond with enthusiasm. Statutes can be read, and case law can be
spun, to achieve this goal. The match may be imperfect, the results
may be psychologically devastating, and privacy rights may suffer,
but a simulacrum of a "normal" family may be achieved. 1
33
131 Id. at 34.
132 Id. at 35.
133 It would appear that some circumstances do exist, however, where the
courts will not leap to supply a "dad" to a fatherless household. In Steven S. v. Deb-
orah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005), the trial court held that a man who
had offered his semen for insemination by the birth mother should be awarded paren-
tal rights over the objection of the birth mother. The trial court noted, "Other than
[Steven], there is no presumed or biological father. [Steven] is the genetic father; to
find that [Steven] is not the father would deny to the child the emotional and financial
support a second parent can provide." Id. at 485 (bracketed text in source). In an
abrupt departure from the usual policy of finding a dad if a sperm donor exists, the
appellate court held that California's version of the UPA barred the man's claim.
Because the donor had been sexually intimate around the time the insemination oc-
curred, he argued that the statute should not apply. The court rejected this argument,
stating that the words of the statute were clear and that "there is no indication that the
Legislature intended to establish a public policy against donating sperm for use by a
woman who is not the donor's wife, even where there is an intimate relationship." Id.
at 487. The court's opinion, however, can be read as supporting, rather than subvert-
ing traditional notions of family since they were likely swayed by the fact the sperm
donor was married to another woman at the time that he was assisting conception by
supplying sperm via artificial and more traditional modes of insemination. Id. at 321-
24.
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III. FROZEN EMBRYO DISPUTES IN ISRAEL AND THE
UNITED STATES
A. Israel
Israel's pronatalist approach to ART and openness to alternative
family structures is apparent in its handling of disputes arising in the
wake of egg-extraction, cryopreservation, and storage. Frozen embryo
disputes arise when couples marry, pursue fertility treatment that re-
sult in cryopreserved embryos, and then divorce, holding different
ideas about what should happen to their jointly-created embryos.
These cases have achieved a degree of celebrity in both the United
States and Israel, yet the approaches taken in each country could not
be more different. In Israel, a woman's desire to achieve biological
parenthood is viewed with reverence and accorded substantial weight
when balanced against competing concerns. In the United States, the
valences run in different directions. The autonomy of the objecting
parent is privileged over conflicting reproductive aspirations, and
courts are loathe to allow single divorcees the opportunity to start a
family over the objections of their former spouses.
Israel's policy regarding frozen embryos is consistent with its
generally pronatalist stance. Guiding precedent was set by Ruti and
Danny Nachmani in a judicial odyssey that reached conclusion at a
full-panel hearing before the Israeli Supreme Court.134 Initially, Ruti
and Danny Nachmani were united in their quest to start a family.
135
Early in the marriage, Ruti had a hysterectomy, and Ruti and Danny
together successfully challenged Israeli national health regulations
that prohibited gestational surrogacy.136 Having won that battle, Ruti
and Danny underwent IVF, froze and stored eleven embryos, and then
signed an agreement with a surrogacy agency in California.137 Less
than two months later, Ruti and Danny broke up, and the battle over
the embryos' fate began.
1 38
Ruti, still intent on becoming a mother, was willing to relinquish
all marital property so long as she could use the embryos to create a
biologically related child.' 39 Danny objected to her proposed use of
134 See WEISBERG, supra note 79, at 84.
135 Id. at 67.
136 Id. at 70-75.
137 Id. at 76.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 77 (Before the rabbinical court charged with approving their divorce,
Ruti told the judges: "I don't want anything from Danny. I'll give him everything. I
don't want money. I don't want the restaurant. Just let me use our embryos. This is
2006].
HEALTH M4 TRIX
the embryos and instructed the Tel Aviv hospital storing the embryos
not to release them into Ruti's custody.140 Ruti responded with a legal
petition that would ultimately focus international attention on her own
family drama, as well as the broader question of how embryo disputes
should be addressed.
Ruti's petition for release of the frozen embryos was heard ini-
tially by a judge at the Haifa District Court, who found in favor of
Ruti on contractual grounds. 141 The judge held that Danny's initial
consent to extraction and fertilization constituted consent to the entire
process, including implantation into a surrogate.142 Withdrawal of
consent once the egg extraction and embryo fertilization had occurred
was tantamount to a breach of contract, which the court would not
sanction. 143
In private interviews following the case, the judge also revealed
his impressions regarding the implications of the case for equality
between the sexes. Characterizing Danny's position as "chauvinistic,"
the judge stated,
Slowly, we are improving the status of women. I didn't like
the fact that Danny could rule his wife, that he could say,
'O.K., I don't want a child, so we have to put an end to these
embryos and that's the way it is going to be'. . . . Is it reason-
able that the fate of a woman who wishes to continue with
birth resulting from IVF should be determined by the chang-
ing moods of the husband whenever it suits him?' 44
Danny appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court, arguing that the
lower court's ruling violated his right to avoid fatherhood with its
associated social and financial responsibilities. 145 Additionally, Danny
disputed the district court's contract analysis, maintaining that his
initial consent to sperm donation did not imply consent to embryo
implantation. Rather, he argued that individual consent was required
for each stage of the IVF/surrogacy process.14 6
The Israeli Supreme Court, in a five-panel opinion, ruled that
Danny's rights to avoid parenthood superseded Ruti's rights to
my one chance to be a mother.").
140 Id.
141 Id. at 79.
142 id.
141 Id. at 80.
'44 Id. at 80-81.
14' Id. at 82.
146 id.
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achieve it. 147 When the dual interests in becoming and resisting par-
enthood clashed, the court felt it would be "improper to enlist the le-
gal system to force parenthood on someone who does not want it."
148
In support of its conclusion, the court drew on principles estab-
lished in Israeli abortion and service contract cases. When a woman
seeks an abortion, the court noted, a husband has no right to oppose
the termination of the embryo; consequently, to preserve gender eq-
uity, a wife should not be given the authority to oppose a husband's
request to terminate the existence of a jointly-created embryo. 149 Ad-
ditionally, the court interpreted Ruti's request for embryo custody as
"forcing Danny to have a child."'150 Drawing on traditional contract
principles that render personal service contracts unenforceable, the
court held that Ruti's request required personal services on Danny's
part that were beyond the court's power to require. 15 In response to
Ruti's argument that she had endured the rigors of egg extraction in
reliance on Danny's consent to embryo implantation, the court stated
that both Ruti and Danny's consent to participate in the IVF process
were predicated on the existence of an intact marriage.152 Conse-
quently, reliance on consent procured in anticipation of parenting
within the bonds of matrimony could not be binding once the mar-
riage dissolved.
153
The Head of the Israeli Supreme Court ordered a rehearing due to
the importance and ground-breaking nature of the case. A panel of
eleven justices reheard the case, focusing their attention on the scope
of Danny's consent and his rights to refuse consent once the IVF
process had been set into motion.
After deliberating for over a year, the Israeli Supreme Court, sit-
ting in full, reversed the earlier decision and ordered the frozen em-
bryos be released to Ruti for implantation. 154 Although four justices
dissented, the remaining seven were clear that Ruti's right to biologi-
cal parenthood was to assume priority status. 155 Parenthood, the ma-
jority opinion asserted, is "a basic value for the individual and society
.... Taking parenthood away from a person is like taking away that
147 Id.
148 Id. at 83.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 85.
151 Id. at 85-89.
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person's soul.' ' 156 Conversely, an individual's autonomy interests in
refusing parenthood could not be accorded primary status because
"there is no value, in and of itself, in the absence of parenthood."'1 7
The majority opinion rejected the notion that Danny's consent
was valid only so long as he and Ruti remained married and that addi-
tional consent was needed at each stage of the IVF process. Instead,
they considered Danny's original consent to be valid and irrepu-
diable. 58 Rather than perceive the IVF process as requiring the con-
sent of both parties for its continuation, the court viewed the process
as something that, once begun, could only be stopped with the consent
of both parties. Stressing the joint collaboration that generated the
embryo, one concurring justice wrote, "[I]t is not reasonable after the
completion of a joint creation, that one of the partners would be able
to destroy the creation against the wishes of the other who wants to
continue the process.'
159
Emphasis on child-bearing as an essential life-task-as expressed
in religious law and scripture-is woven throughout the opinion. The
majority and concurring opinions quoted the Torah and the Mishnah
liberally to emphasize traditional notions that children are necessary
both to give life meaning and leave a legacy for the future. 6 0
Although sympathetic to Danny's plight, 16 1 the judges' opinions
respond to and reflect Israel's cultural imperative toward
reproduction. Respect for and deference to desires to remain
autonomous and free of family ties does not touch the same cultural
nerve and receives less legal deference. In the United States, cultural
imperatives have generated very different legal responses to frozen
embryo disputes.
116 Id. at 86.
157 id.
158 Id. (The court also rejected the earlier panel's reasoning regarding abortion
on the grounds that a woman retains an absolute prerogative regarding whether to
continue or terminate a pregnancy because her bodily integrity is at stake. Because a
husband's bodily integrity is not at issue, he gains no absolute prerogative to destroy
the embryo unilaterally.).
"9 Id. at 87.
160 See, e.g., "Be fruitful and multiply," "He who does not have children is
considered to be dead," and "Give me children, or I will die." Id. at 90-91.
161 Id. at 88 (both Justice Goldberg and Justice Mazza conditioned the award
of the embryos to Ruti on an agreement that Danny be absolved from child support
payments).
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B. United States
To date, six state supreme courts have ruled on couples' frozen
embryo battles. 62 In each case, the court found in favor of the object-
ing party and against the party seeking use of the embryos to achieve
biological parenthood. Although the analytical route taken to this des-
tination has differed, the courts have uniformly valorized autonomy
rights and minimized the interest in becoming a parent.
The first and most oft-cited frozen-embryo case is Davis v.
Davis,163 decided nearly fifteen years ago in Tennessee. Although
cognizant of their duties to obtain informed consent, fertility clinics at
that time were not alert to the many sticky situations that might arise
in the aftermath of embryo-cryopreservation. Gamete contributors
might die, become disabled or divorce, but clinics had not yet begun
to require couples to sign dispositional agreements discussing what to
do should those contingencies arise. Consequently, in the Davis case,
Junior and Mary Sue had neither signed a dispositional agreement nor
discussed what should be done with the embryos in the event of
divorce. 
64
The couple did divorce and adopted different views regarding the
embryos' fate. Junior Davis sought to have them destroyed, while
Mary Sue wished to donate them to a childless couple.'65 Although
supportive of the power of contract law to sort out such muddles, the
court had no express or implied contract to rely on, so they turned to
constitutional principles for guidance.
166
The court's constitutional discussion is perplexing because it be-
gins by asserting the parity of the dual rights of achieving and avoid-
ing parenthood, but ends by establishing a presumption that signifi-
cantly favors procreation-avoidance.167 Paying lip service to "the joys
of parenthood" and weighing those joys against the "relative anguish
162 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (ruling that agreements be-
tween gamete donors about disposition of pre-zygotes should be assumed valid and
binding); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1051 (Mass. 2000) (holding "that a consent
form signed by the parties on the one hand and the clinic on the other, providing that,
on the parties' separation, preembryos were to be given to the wife for implantation,
was unenforceable"); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (ruling husband
was entitled to custody of preembryos in divorce settlement); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d
707 (N.J. 2001); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); In re Marriage of
Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (holding that a "statute governing child custody
did not apply to frozen embryos").
1 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
'6 Id. at 590.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 590-91.
167 Id. at 601.
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of a lifetime of unwanted parenthood," the court initially maintained
that "Mary Sue ... and Junior ... must be seen as entirely equivalent
gamete-providers." 168 Yet, after considering Junior Davis's prediction
that having a biological heir raised outside the sanctity of an intact
nuclear family would be psychologically torturous, the court could no
longer view the Davis' interests as equally weighted. 169 Instead, the
court ruled in favor of Junior Davis and adopted a presumption that
tilts strongly in favor of the spouse who would destroy the embryos to
avoid "unwanted parenthood.'
170
The Davis case, splashed as it was across the covers of national
newspapers, sensitized fertility clinics to the possibility that the em-
bryos they were helping couples create could later become the subject
of heated litigation. To avoid getting caught in litigation crossfire,
fertility clinics began inserting dispositional agreements into their
treatment consent forms.
The next case, Kass v. Kass,'71 arose five years later. The Kasses,
New Yorkers who sought treatment at the John T. Mather Memorial
Hospital, signed forms that contained two provisions relating to
embryo disposition. 172 The first provision stated, "In the event of
divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes
must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as
directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction."' 173 The second
provision, triggered by "death or any other unforeseen circumstances
that may result in neither of us being able to determine the disposition
of any stored frozen pre-zygotes," presented a number of options for
embryo disposition, including thawing, adoption by an infertile couple
and donation to a research lab.174 The Kasses opted for the latter.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 603.
170 The court held that when spouses' interests regarding frozen embryos
collide, "[o]rdinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming
that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means
other than use of the preembryos in question." Id. at 604.
'1 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
172 Id. at 176.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 176-77. In addition to the triggering language quoted above, the form
also contained language that stated that the elected choice for embryo disposition
should be followed if "we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are unable to
make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored, frozen pre-zygotes." Id. Al-
though a plain reading of this language would suggest that the clause was meant to
apply in the event of death or incapacity, consistent with the triggering language at
the beginning of the consent form, the court chose to interpret the language to cover
the situation where the couple disagreed and failed to reach a unified position regard-
ing the fate of the embryos.
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Although the court could have read the forms to merely indicate that
the Kasses intended a family court rule on the embryos' fate should
their marriage come to an end, the court instead held that the forms
revealed the couple's unequivocal intent to relinquish the embryos for
research. 
75
To reach this conclusion, the court had to engage in considerable
interpretive gymnastics. First, they had to find that language written
with death or disability in mind also applied when the couple was
alive and well, but simply at loggerheads as to what to do. The court
extended the contingency language applicable when "neither of us [is]
able to determine the disposition of [the embryos]"'' 76 to cover the
situation where each member of the couple was fully capable of form-
ing and expressing an opinion regarding the embryos' disposition.
Similarly, the court had to find the Kass' research-election, when
"[we] are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our
stored, frozen pre-zygotes,"' 177 was meant to apply when each had
definitely made a decision regarding the embryos, but the decisions
did not converge. Finally, the court had to find that divorce fell within
the category of "unforeseen circumstance ... result[ing] in neither of
us being able to determine ... disposition,"' 178 when, in fact, the pos-
sibility of divorce had been explicitly contemplated and provided for
in another section of the form.
179
These logical contortions can be explained only by
acknowledging the court's pre-determination to destroy the embryos.
The reasons for this are likely linked to the same concerns that led the
Davis court to weigh the constitutional value of avoiding procreation
so heavily. 80 Judges assume the creation of unwanted familial ties
portend psychological devastation. 181 They do not approach a life of
175 Id. at 178.
176 Id. at 176.
177 id.
178 Id.
179 Id. (The other part of the form stated, "In the event of divorce, we
understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a
property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.").
180 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
181 This worry was clearly expressed in Justice Friedmann's concurring opin-
ion at the intermediate court level in Kass. Advocating for an stronger procreation-
avoidant approach than that articulated in Davis, Friedmann explained,
Once a child is born, there is no way to end biological ties, and very few
ways to end emotional ones .... Put somewhat differently, '[e]ven if no
rearing duties or even contact result[s], the unconsenting partner [former
spouse] will know that biologic offspring exist, with the powerful attendant
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unrequited yearning and forced childlessness with the same
apocalyptic vision.I12
Since Davis and Kass, judicial attitudes toward frozen embryo
disputes have, if anything, become even clearer. Indeed, even when an
agreement clearly vests one party with custody of the embryos in the
event of divorce, courts have refused to enforce the agreement on the
grounds that enforcement would violate public policy. In A.Z. v.B.Z,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court looked to legislative enactments
and judicial decisions involving adoption and surrogacy agreements to
discern a public policy against binding individuals to previously
reached decisions that impose unwanted family ties.'
83
The New Jersey Supreme Court discovered similar state policies
in its family law precedents and, similarly, found dispositional agree-
ments resulting in coerced parenthood against public policy. 84 Again,
court speculation regarding the psychological impact of creating un-
wanted parenthood seemed to drive the decisions. 185 The objecting
spouse in JB. was relieved of any possible social or financial burdens
because the child/children of the resulting embryo would be adopted
by an infertile couple. 86 Nevertheless, the court found this fact irrele-
vant to larger consideration of the objecting spouse's welfare.' 87 Im-
plantation, it observed, if successful, would result in the birth of a
biological child and could have life-long "emotional and psychologi-
,,188cal repercussions.
Judicial concern over the psychological effects of forced parent-
hood likewise drove the decision in In re Marriage of Witten to leave
the disputed frozen embryos in storage indefinitely. 8 9 The petitioner,
Tamera Witten, was childless and sought to use the eggs for implanta-
tion in a surrogate to create a genetically linked child.' 90 She testified
that upon a successful pregnancy, "she would afford Trip [(her ex-
reverberations of guilt, attachment, or responsibility which that knowledge
can ignite.
Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150, 166 (1997) (Friedmann, J., concurring) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
182 See Ellen Waldman & Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: Erasing
Women's Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
285 (2005).
183 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-59 (Mass. 2000).
's4 J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 717 (N.J. 2001).
185 See id.
186 Id. at 711.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 717.
189 672 N.W.2d 768, 783 (Iowa 2003).
'9 Id. at 772.
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husband)] the opportunity to exercise parental rights or to have his
rights terminated."' 91 Trip testified that he did not want Tamera to use
the embryos, did not want them destroyed, and would permit donation
to another couple. 192 Characterizing prior judicial treatment of frozen
embryo disputes as following a contractual approach, balancing test,
or contemporaneous mutual consent model, the court adopted the lat-
ter, finding it most protective of an objecting spouse's right to change
his or her mind. 93 Once again, one spouse's desire to be a biological
parent took a back seat to the other spouse's interest in avoiding un-
wanted biological ties.
CONCLUSION
Comparative analysis provides a perch from which to view our
own practices from a different perspective. American political rhetoric
reverberates with the constant invocation of family values and the
"culture of life." Yet, a market-driven approach to health care and
deep ambivalence about whether infertility is a disease that demands
treatment or forbearance leads to policies that leave infertile couples
largely on their own in seeking access to costly ART treatments.
Additionally, legal protection for lesbians and single women who use
ART to pursue non-traditional family relations is weak and subject to
judicial subversion. Conversely, Israeli enthusiasm for child-bearing
cuts across all categories of family structure. Legal and financial
support for single and gay-headed families is robust, and judicial
rulings ruminating on the tensions between rights to create and avoid
family invariably find the rights of creation more compelling. Placing
Israeli and American approaches side by side, it is hard to conclude
that America offers the more "family-friendly" regime.
In both countries, skepticism exists regarding ART's impact on
the traditional nuclear family. In Israel, the concerns reside
mainly within the religious community. In America, fears for the
physical and psychological health of "children of choice"'194 are wide-
191 Id.
192 Id. at 773.
'9' Id. at 779, 782-83. In awarding preembyos to a protesting husband in a
disposition dispute, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the husband "can
exercise his right not to procreate in a limited way that allows the preembryos to
develop but avoids placing him in the unwanted parenting role." In re Marriage of
Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1092 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd sub noma. Litowitz v.
Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
194 See generally JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND
THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3-4 (1994) (author stating "[t]he goal of this
book is to show the importance of procreative liberty . . . in devising the framework
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spread.'95 This is likely due to the deep-seated gender-bias and preju-
dice that imbues current thinking about healthy family environments.
Initial inquiries into the emotional/psychological health of ART's
progeny, however, are encouraging. 96 On standard psychosocial
measures, children born via unconventional methods into nontradi-
tional families where they are loved and wanted fare as well as chil-
dren conceived and reared in more traditional arrangements. 1
97
Further empirical work is needed and continued assessments of
ART's safety should accompany each new innovation. But, even if all
the news is good, it remains to be seen whether our cultural priorities
are susceptible to change. ART forces us to ask unsettling questions
about the nature and identity of family ties. How we answer those
questions will depend, in part, on how open and porous our cultural
norms are to the new data that experience with ART creates.
for resolving the controversies that reproductive technology creates").
195 Press Release, Johns Hopkins Med. Insts., Expert Panel to Examine Health
Effects of Assisted Reproductive Technologies on Children (June 11, 2003),
http://www.dnapolicy.org.
There have been a number of reports in recent years on the health and de-
velopmental outcomes of children conceived through Assisted Reproduc-
tive Technology (ART). These reports have generated news and opinion
pieces in the popular press that have caused some concern and confusion
among patients, the public, and policy makers.
Id. (citation omitted).
196 See generally Sheila A.M. McLean, Assisted Reproduction and the Wel-
fare of the Child (July 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.ccels.cf.ac.uk/literature/publications/2005/mcleanpaper.pdf) (arguing that
restrictions on ART services based on the "welfare of the child" often instantiate
unfounded bias and prejudice against individuals based on sexual orientation, marital
status and the like).
197 Susan Golombok et al., The "Test-Tube " Generation: Parent-Child Rela-
tionships and the Psychological Well-Being of In Vitro Fertilization Children at Ado-
lescence, 72 CHILD DEV. 599 (2001).
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